A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and Economics Curricula by Ulen, Thomas S.
San Diego Law Review
Volume 41 | Issue 1 Article 5
2-1-2004
A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other)
Additions to the Law School and Economics
Curricula
Thomas S. Ulen
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San
Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas S. Ulen, A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and Economics Curricula, 41 San Diego L.
Rev. 35 (2004).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol41/iss1/5
ULEN.DOC 9/17/2019 2:51 PM 
 
 35 
A Crowded House: Socioeconomics    
(and Other) Additions to the                  
Law School and Law and               
Economics Curricula 
THOMAS S. ULEN* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.   INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 35 
II.   THE LAW AND ECONOMICS CANON ...................................................................... 38 
 A. Scholarly Innovations ................................................................................ 38 
III.   WHAT TO ADD? ................................................................................................... 47 
 A. Socioeconomics .......................................................................................... 49 
 B. Behavioral Law and Economics ................................................................ 50 
 C. Equitable Distribution of Wealth and Income ............................................ 51 
 D. Other Topics .............................................................................................. 53 
IV.   CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 54 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a commonplace of modern (North American) commentary on 
legal education and legal scholarship to remark on the transformation 
wrought on every field by economic analysis.  Indeed, many of the core 
fields of law are now taught as much from an economic point of view as 
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36 
from a doctrinal point of view.1 
One of the remarkable aspects of the centrality of economic analysis 
in the modern American legal academy is that it seemed, at one point, 
an extremely unlikely thing to occur.  In the early days of law and 
economics—roughly the late 1970s and early 1980s—the field came 
upon the academy so quickly and initially seemed so attractive that law 
school faculties, which were generally not equipped to offer courses in 
the subject, scrambled to find instructors.  Some law schools were reduced 
to hiring economists to teach the new material.  Others invited traditionally 
trained law professors to undertake teaching the material by assigning 
Judge Posner’s pathbreaking textbook and staying a chapter or two 
ahead of the students, much as my high school vice principal did in my 
calculus class. 
From these shaky beginnings, law and economics managed to secure 
its position in the legal academy.  It developed a core of skillful and 
devoted instructors, encouraged additional textual material, fostered an 
ever-expanding corpus of scholarship, and in all other ways became an 
established presence within the legal academy.2  It is a testament to what 
must be the inherent attractiveness of law and economics and to its now 
settled position in the legal curriculum that it is no longer necessary for 
law schools to hire economists to teach the material to their students.  
Rather, it is possible to hire extremely competent scholars who either 
 
 1. For example, most of the leading contracts casebooks today include a discussion of “efficient breach of contract,” something that was very rare fifteen years ago.  See, 
e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 19–20 (3d ed. 1980).  And one can scarcely talk about property law without at least mentioning the Coase Theorem, about criminal law and punishment without reference to the Becker theory of the decision to commit a crime, about remedies without reference to Calabresi & Melamed, see infra note 30, about tort law without reference to theories of the “least-cost avoider,” and so on.  See generally ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2003).  2. In Legal Scholarship Today, Judge Posner identifies two factors that account, he believes, for the general rise of “law and . . .”  scholarship: (1) independent, valuable developments in contiguous disciplines, such as the rise of the analysis of nonmarket behavior in microeconomics and the revival of political philosophy after the publication of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice in 1971; and (2) the dramatic increase in the number of law professors over the period 1960 to 2000, which created, he suggests, pressure for these professors to adopt new forms of scholarship to distinguish their work from that of those who came before and to allow them to compete effectively with their peers for academic favor.  Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1317–19, 1324 (2002). In A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Scientific Method, and Experimental Work 
in Law, I agree with Judge Posner’s identification of the prevailing trends in legal scholarship but offer a somewhat different view of the reasons for those trends.  In brief, my argument is that the longer term trend away from doctrinal scholarship and toward more theoretical and empirical legal scholarship is a Weberian process of rationalization in the scholarly study of law.  Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, 
Scientific Method, and Experimental Work in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875. 
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have both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in economics, or have a J.D. from a top law 
school where they learned law from faculties that were fully conversant 
in, comfortable with, and contributing to law and economics.3 
In this brief Article, I want to remark on two developments that I 
perceive in the teaching of law and economics in the North American 
legal academy.4  First, I perceive a paradoxical trend: As law and 
economics becomes more firmly accepted among legal scholars, the 
need for separate courses in law and economics may decline.  I hedge by 
saying “may” to cover the possibility, which I discuss later, that the 
incorporation of law and economics into other courses might be 
haphazard rather than systematic.  There will almost always be a place 
for a more formal treatment of the economics relevant to legal inquiry,5 
but at the moment the trend is away from a separate course in law and 
economics and toward the incorporation of the relevant concepts by 
means of the “pervasive method” of instruction.6  In what follows I shall 
try to explain why this is happening and to evaluate whether, in light of 
other developments, that is a good thing.  Second, I believe that the legal 
academy is developing an important independent literature in law and 
 
 3. I have insisted to my economist and European law professor friends that they would be amazed at the sophisticated understanding of microeconomic theory, game theory, and econometrics that many of the top young legal scholars possess these days simply on the basis of their legal training.  4. I limit my remarks to trends in Canada and the United States.  There are productive scholars in law and economics throughout the world, but I am less familiar with foreign legal educational systems and, so, am unable to comment on how those other legal educational systems accommodate a legal innovation such as law and economics.  My impression is that law and economics has not yet had the impact on, say, British and Continental European legal scholars and education that it has had in North America.  5. It is not inconceivable that the legal academy will eventually develop a law-specific course in economics and in other social science tools that are useful to the examination of law.  As an example of a law-specific economic tool, consider the notion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 41–42.  Welfare economics as taught in economics departments focuses on Pareto efficiency and rarely, if ever, mentions Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  That notion is, however, central in law and economics.  6. I first heard the expression “the pervasive method” applied to the practice of introducing the concepts of professional responsibility in every course rather than treating those concepts in a separate course.  Similarly, one could argue that law students today learn law and economics not by means of a separate course but piecemeal by, for example, picking up something about the Coase Theorem in property law, about Pareto efficiency in their discussion of breach in contract law, and about deterrence theory in criminal law.  Some law schools include a “legal methods” course in the first-year curriculum that introduces many of the relevant economic concepts. 
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economics.  By “independent,” I mean that this literature has begun to 
take on a flavor and dynamic of its own, a distinctively legal cast.  
Originally, law and economics consisted of nothing more than the 
application of relatively simple microeconomic concepts to legal 
decisionmaking.  However, over time, law and economics has adapted 
concepts from other disciplines, such as political science, psychology, 
and sociology, so as to extend simple microeconomics into a more 
complex and refined analysis that addresses the particularities and 
contexts of legal decisionmaking.  In Part III, I will seek to characterize 
two examples of this independent literature and to discuss how it might 
work its way into our teaching. 
II.  THE LAW AND ECONOMICS CANON 
When law and economics first appeared in the law school curriculum 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it had a relatively easy birth by 
comparison to other scholarly innovations.  There was already a 
comprehensive and accessible text (Judge Posner’s estimable Economic 
Analysis of Law),7 an extensive scholarly output of articles in 
professional journals from which instructors could cull instructional 
materials, and several important peer-reviewed journals devoted to 
scholarly work in this area. 
A.  Scholarly Innovations 
It is hard to exaggerate how important these factors are to a 
successful scholarly innovation.  As we shall see, most scholarly 
innovations are not so fortunate.  The very novelty of an innovative 
approach often means that there are no canonical texts with which to 
instruct those new to the field.  And the lack of such texts makes it 
difficult for instructors who find the field attractive but are not 
themselves learned in its materials to propose and teach a new course 
in that field.  The academy rarely rewards professors for developing 
these texts or teaching new courses.  If the field catches on (an 
eventuality that is obviously made less likely precisely because there 
may be no settled course materials), then such canonical materials 
eventually appear, summarizing the new field in a comprehensive way.  
The presence of accessible teaching and scholarly materials is 
absolutely vital to the curricular success of the innovation.  They allow 
students to see the field as a coherent whole: that the field has a settled 
body of learning, that there is a consensus among its proponents about 
 
 7. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). 
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what is valuable and new in the scholarly innovation, and that the 
roistering and roiling controversies of the early days of the scholarly 
innovation have given way to grudging acceptance by the critics on the 
one hand and enthusiastic advocacy by proponents on the other. 
Established scholarly outlets may also have a difficult time accepting 
scholarship by those learned in the field.  Unless the field manages to 
produce, at an early stage in the innovation, a high-quality journal 
devoted to articles in the new area, the innovation may not gain traction 
among scholars who read and pay attention to the far edges of their field.  
If the output of the innovators is scattered among the normal output 
within the larger field in which the innovation is occurring, then it may 
be very difficult for those outside the innovation to realize that there is 
an innovation underway. 
Those scholars already established in the larger field will be looking 
for other indicators of a successful scholarly innovation: that there is 
a “research program” in the field; that the innovators have thrown 
important new light on previously dark corners of the subject area; that 
there are scholarly journals devoted to publication (and perhaps to the 
peer review of manuscripts); that there is a professional organization for 
those in the field and that organization holds an annual meeting, 
publishes proceedings, and performs other services for scholars; that 
there are other periodic conferences and symposia on topics in the field, 
and so on.8 
There is, however, another, darker side of scholarly innovation to 
which Judge Posner has correctly called attention: the problems of 
quality assurance that any scholarly innovation presents.  He notes that 
innovators desire to secure a foothold in the academy and, to do so, have 
an incentive to cite one another’s work and use those citations as 
evidence of scholarly acceptance.  He calls this practice “circulating-pump 
scholarship.”9  The point is especially acute in the early days of a scholarly 
innovation, when those outside the innovating group are skeptical and 
those within the innovating group are eager to find acceptance.  It 
could be the case that those within the academy are well aware of the 
circulating-pump phenomenon and therefore make it so difficult for 
scholarly innovators to secure a position that those who do succeed must 
have something significant to say. 
 
 8. Law and economics, unlike other recent innovations in the legal academy, had or quickly developed all of these indicia of a stable academic field. 
 9. See Posner, supra note 2, at 1325–26. 
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I have sketched some factors that may help to explain why some 
academic innovations are successful and others are not.10  Rather than 
elaborate on these factors, I turn now to the first point I mentioned 
above: the paradoxical point that as it has gained acceptance, the need 
for separate courses in that field appears to have waned. 
Teaching law and economics to law students is difficult.  Most of 
them do not have a formal background in economics, and they have 
widely variant levels of knowledge of the subject.  Some may have 
undergraduate degrees in economics or cognate fields, such as finance; 
some may have Ph.D.s in economics; some may have undergraduate 
degrees in engineering or the natural sciences and find the mathematical 
nature of much modern economic reasoning to be easy to grasp; some 
may have been out of school for twenty years and have never had any 
formal exposure to economics; some, while undergraduates, may have 
fled from economics courses as if from the plague and be extremely 
wary of their abilities to follow the material.  Getting a class in which 
students have such disparate backgrounds to feel comfortable with the 
economic basis of the material is a formidable task for even the most 
gifted teacher. 
There are at least three general methods of doing this.  One, which I 
follow, is to spend the first two or so weeks of the semester teaching 
microeconomic theory.  I do not try to convey the technical details of the 
subject so much as a feel for the questions that economists ask, the 
answers that they give, and the structure of microeconomic theory.  For 
reasons that I shall return to in Part III, I spend more time than would be 
the case in an undergraduate course on microeconomic theory on the 
topic of welfare economics and how economists have sought to analyze 
issues of distributional equity. 
The great cost of my method of trying to equip all the students with a 
common grounding in microeconomics is that I use up a significant 
fraction of the semester before I even get to the core material of the 
economic analysis of law.  Being an inveterate proponent of cost-benefit 
analysis, I do so on the ground that making certain everyone in the class 
has the same economic toolkit pays substantial dividends once we get to 
the law and economics material.  I do not have to interrupt the flow of 
explaining, for example, contract law and the agency problem with a 
 
 10. A famous recent example of an innovation that has not, apparently, entrenched itself in the legal academy is critical legal studies.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in 
Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 525–28 (2000).  For a general discussion of innovations in the legal academy, see Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: 
On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2001).  Let me not be too triumphal about law and economics.  It has so far been a singular success, but who knows what the future holds? 
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short course on game theory; nor do I have to stop to explain what 
attitudes towards risk are and how insurance markets deal with adverse 
selection and moral hazard. 
A second method of teaching law students enough economics to do 
law and economics is simply to plunge into the material—beginning, for 
instance, with the Coase Theorem—on the theory that the best way to 
learn economics is to do it.  Slowly, through the repeated interaction 
with the examples and the back and forth of questions and answers, the 
students will get the drift of what the field is all about.  The potentially 
great cost of this method is that it may scare many of the students out of 
their wits and lead them to drop the course.  Arguably, the group most 
likely to be frightened by the “cold plunge” method is the group most 
likely to get the most from seeing the course through to its conclusion. 
A third method, intermediate between the two already mentioned, is to 
take a shorter period at the beginning of the semester to teach economics, 
but to confine one’s instruction to relatively simple propositions—such 
as that “people respond to incentives.”11  One could plausibly claim that 
this proposition, duly elaborated, is really all that one truly needs to 
master in order to understand law and economics.12  Indeed, in the 
introductory chapter of our text, Bob Cooter and I identify the central 
premise of law and economics to be the idea that legal rules create 
incentives for behavior and that one may use the simplest notions of 
microeconomics to explain and predict how decisionmakers are likely to 
respond to the incentives of legal rules.13  If that is, in fact, the core of 
law and economics, then one might argue that the technical material of 
economics is not necessary to do law and economics.  Ultimately, I do 
not believe that.  I think that the additional tools, some of which I have 
already mentioned and some others—graphical analysis, game theory, 
discounting to present value, performing and evaluating empirical work, 
and so forth—are tools that a well-educated law student ought to master.  
They are, I believe, essential to both scholars and practitioners in the 
analysis of a wide range of legal topics. 
However one decides to approach this first problem (that of equipping 
 
 11. See STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3 (1993).  12. “The main contribution of law and economics” is to take seriously the proposition that people respond to incentives.  Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, 
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2000). 
 13. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 3. 
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law students with enough economics to understand the material), there 
are more and equally serious problems to come.  Another formidable 
impediment to teaching the material is that the average law student 
typically has a great deal of skepticism about the worth of law and 
economics.  He or she seems to approach a course in the subject as a 
necessary evil, akin to having root canal work done.  Not knowing what 
law and economics is about is marginally worse than finding out, just as 
enduring the poking and drilling of the dentist is only slightly less 
painful than the malady that has occasioned the visit.  I am referring here 
both to the daunting technical nature of law and economics and to the 
allegedly conservative political nature of law and economics.  I have 
already commented on the technical nature.  Here, let me turn to the 
seemingly off-putting political nature of law and economics. 
I confess to being mystified as to why or how law students frequently 
come to the study of law and economics forewarned that “here be 
dragons.”  My sense—it is no more systematic than that—is that students 
have been signaled (by reading, word of mouth, other professors, older 
students, and observation) that there is a high correlation between one’s 
comfort level with law and economics and one’s comfort level with the 
policies and personalities of the conservative wing of the Republican 
Party.  In my view and experience, that correlation is spurious.14  But 
this is, nonetheless, a widespread delusion.  What I try to tell the students 
early in my introductory law and economics course is that, as everyone 
active in the field knows and as any skeptic could discover by attending 
any scholarly meeting—such as the annual meetings of the American 
Law and Economics Association, the Canadian Law and Economics 
Association, or the European Association for Law and Economics—is 
that those in the field espouse a very broad range of political ideologies.  
That would be evident if it were easy to determine each scholar’s 
 
 14. I should also say that, for someone who has spent a great deal of his professional time in the rest of the university (that is, outside a law school), the ideological—more accurately, the seemingly ideological—nature of much law school faculty disputes is breathtakingly large.  To put the matter baldly, I cannot recall in the past quarter century a hiring or promotion decision in any of the nonlaw academic units with which I have been affiliated at the University of Illinois in which the candidate’s political ideology has played a significant part in the faculty deliberations regarding hiring.  By contrast, I can hardly remember a hiring or promotion decision in the College of Law in which political ideology did not play a significant, if unarticulated, part. Much of this is, however, shadow boxing in two senses: First, as I have tried to indicate, the supposed correlation between political ideology and law and economics (and other areas of specialization) is, I believe, spurious.  Second, the true lines of dispute on law school faculties may have to do with something other than areas of specialization or political ideology, but those may be the convenient labels under which to group the disputants and their differences.  I think, for instance, that there is an important difference of opinion about the relative weight to give to scholarship and professional education as principal goals of the law school. 
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political proclivities.15  But it is not.  Most of the time one does not know 
or care what the political ideology of the scholar is; it is simply 
irrelevant to the determination of the worth of his scholarship.  What 
unites those in law and economics is not political beliefs but rather the 
belief that economics is a highly useful (though not necessarily 
dispositive) method of examining a wide range of legal topics.16 
Yet another predictable problem in teaching a separate course in law 
and economics is that the field has grown so fertile that there simply is 
not enough time to cover all the topics that one ought to cover in a one 
semester survey course.  I find, for example, that in my introductory 
course to law and economics I cannot easily get through an introduction 
to microeconomic theory, the economics of property, the economics of 
contracts, the economics of torts, the economics of the legal profession 
and the decision to litigate or to settle, and the economics of criminal 
law and punishment.  By the end of the semester, I am going through 
material so quickly that I often take no more than one day to present 
Professor Becker’s famous economic model of the decision to commit a 
crime and the criminal justice system implications of that model.17  I do 
not have time to deal with the burgeoning empirical literature in law and 
economics (never mind an introduction to quantitative techniques such 
as statistics and regression analysis),18 with the remarkably interesting 
and promising literature on the relationship between law and social 
 
 15. At a recent meeting of the Midwest Law and Economics Association, Professor James Lindgren of the Northwestern University School of Law, as part of a larger research project, administered a portion of the General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center to the participants in the conference—all of them law professors and law and economics adherents—in order to determine their political beliefs relative to those of the population as a whole.  As will surprise no one, there was much protest by the law professors about the wording of the questions.  Each participant did his or her questionnaire independently and anonymously.  The results of the same instrument administered to the population as a whole reveals an average liberal-conservative score of about 45%, with 0 being extremely conservative and 100 being extremely liberal.  The average for our group was 73%, with only one of the group apparently qualifying as very conservative.  16. Related to this misperception of the ideological core of law and economics is apparently the view, I am told by my students, that economists are hostile to consideration of the equitable distribution of wealth and income.  That too is a fanciful notion.  But it is one that is important enough to warrant separate discussion, as we shall see in Part III.  17. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170, 172 (1968); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 3–5, 453–54. 
 18. See generally Symposium, Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791. 
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norms,19 or with any of the literature in the economics of public law issues 
such as corporation law,20 securities regulation, bankruptcy,21 environmental 
regulation, health and safety regulation and how regulation and private 
causes of action interact, and so on. 
This brings me directly to the first point that I noted above: namely, 
that at the same time that law and economics has become an established 
part of the law school curriculum and of law professors’ scholarship and 
that the range of law and economics scholarship has been expanding, the 
demand for a separate course in the topic may be waning.  Precisely 
because law and economics has become so familiar in (and perhaps 
central to) the legal academy, nearly every law school course contains an 
economic treatment, however cursory, of that course’s content.  And in 
some instances, there is no treatment other than the economic one. 
The questions are whether this is a good thing and what it might mean 
for further scholarly innovations in the legal curriculum.  One cause for 
concern is that the law and economics that students appear to be picking 
up in their core courses is not particularly good.  On the basis of what I 
have observed, the second- and third-year students who take my stand-
alone law and economics course claim to know the Coase Theorem and 
to understand the Calabresi-Melamed analysis of property rules versus 
liability rules.  But their knowledge and understanding are either 
imperfect or wrong.  For instance, my students often claim to have been 
told that the Coase theorem demonstrates the irrelevancy of law.  Not at 
all.  Often, the theorem demonstrates the centrality of law.22 
To the extent that this is a common occurrence, it cuts against the 
 
 19. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1 (1991) (extending the findings of the importance of social norms over law in a wider variety of examples); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 2–4 (2000) (stressing how costly compliance with social norms signals a low discount rate and, therefore, one’s suitability as a partner for cooperation); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase 
and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 672–74 (1986) (showing that compliance with a prevailing social norm of “neighborliness,” not compliance with the law, motivated both cattle ranchers and those whose property was damaged by wandering cattle); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 339–40 (1997) (showing how economic factors explain the private origins, spread, and evolution of social norms).  
See generally Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and 
Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW 
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000)). 
 20. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439–41 (2001); see also Mark J. Roe, Can Culture 
Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251–53 (2002).  21. See the articles collected in BANKRUPTCY ANTHOLOGY (Charles J. Tabb ed., 2002).  22. The theorem holds that bargaining will lead to efficient resource allocation, regardless of law, when transaction costs are zero or very low.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 81–82.  It follows that when transactions costs are positive, bargaining might not succeed and, therefore, the law might improve resource allocation’s efficiency.  Id. 
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fading away of the stand-alone law and economics course and its 
replacement by incorporation of economic material into the core 
doctrinal courses.  But this may not be a common occurrence, or even if 
it is, it may be only a transitional matter.  For instance, the miscommunication 
about economic concepts may be due to the fact that doctrinal professors 
are not yet familiar enough with the material to work it into their courses 
accurately or comfortably.  Presumably, they will become more familiar 
and comfortable as time goes by. 
To be fair, one should note that when the economic concepts are 
conveyed to a doctrinal class in a full and accurate manner, the effects 
are laudable.  I have already mentioned a prominent example of this in 
contract law, the concept of efficient breach of contract.23  Although 
Professor Robert Birmingham had introduced this notion in the late 
1960s,24 its usefulness—indeed, its centrality—in the analysis of contract 
law was not evident till the mid-1980s.  Now, it is not uncommon to have a 
doctrinal course on contract law organized around the concept of 
efficient breach.25  There are other examples of concepts from law and 
economics that have migrated from stand-alone courses to importance in 
doctrinal analysis, such examples as “least-cost avoider” and “market 
failure.”  When an economic concept has made this transition into the 
core of a doctrinal course, it probably, although not certainly, has been 
convincingly understood by those in the law and is felt to be important 
enough to warrant treatment in an already crowded set of materials.26 
 
 23. See id. at 215.  24. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 292 (1970).  25. There have been, of course, criticisms of the concept of efficient breach.  See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1989).  The idea has withstood these criticisms, as it has been recognized that the notion did not license a cavalier treatment of contractual promises, but rather provided a crisp organizing concept for the pragmatic view that not all enforceable promises ought to be performed.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 215–21.  26. I stop short of contending that the process by which economic concepts become incorporated into doctrinal learning inevitably strips away inaccurate understandings of the underlying economics.  One can imagine that process doing much of the stripping, but not all.  There are still examples of the inaccurate or inappropriate incorporation.  One such is the least-cost avoider idea in tort law, the notion that to promote efficient precaution among future victims and injurers, the court should assign liability to whichever party could have prevented or insured against the accident at lower cost.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 7.  The reason that this notion is of limited practical utility is that in many instances tort involves parties who had no opportunity to identify one another before the accident and therefore could not compare their precautionary costs beforehand, as the rule seems to suggest that parties should do.  See COOTER & 
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These thoughts suggest at least two further queries.  First, what is the 
limit on extrinsic material in the doctrinal courses?  Some might hope 
that the doctrine shrinks to a smaller and smaller nub of the core courses, 
to be replaced by more and more economics, psychology, philosophy, 
sociology, and so on.  But assuming, correctly I believe, that this will not 
and should not happen, one must recognize that the central task of the 
core law school curriculum for the foreseeable future is to train lawyers,  
and that means teaching them doctrine and how to use it.  That being the 
case, there is a limit to how much of the burgeoning law and economics 
(and other extrinsic) literature that can be shoehorned into the first-year 
and other core classes and still do students the service of teaching them 
the doctrinal material.  In fact, we may already be close to that limit. 
Second, in light of all these concerns, what will become of the current 
stand-alone course in law and economics?  It will survive in those schools 
that determine to put severe limits on the amount of nondoctrinal matter 
in their core courses.  In those schools where the law and economics 
content of the core continues to push out doctrine, the stand-alone law 
and economics course may become a seminar in advanced topics or a 
two course sequence for specialists.  There is a cost—perhaps a high 
cost—to either alternative.  Specifically, the remarkably rich body of 
independent literature that law and economics scholars are developing 
will not find a ready audience among law students.27  If the core courses 
teach enough law and economics, then students will probably count 
themselves satisfied with the taste they have had and not pursue an 
advanced course in which the richer literature might appear.28  This 
would be a shame, but it may be an unavoidable shame, given the rich 
array of interesting legal courses and the limited time in which to take 
 
ULEN, supra note 1, at 261.  27. Richard McAdams and I are writing a book that will introduce new law students and new law school faculty to important extra-legal concepts.  We are including concepts from economics, philosophy, game theory, and the like.  Our hope is that the book will equip first-year law students and new faculty with the material that they need to appreciate the new scholarly literature in the law.  28. Every law student might learn about the Calabresi and Melamed analysis of property rules versus liability rules, but only those who take an advanced course will learn about the interesting deeper analyses that have been done with respect to the choice of remedies.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability 
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 715, 715–23 (1996) (using systematic economic analysis to show that liability rules are superior to property rules in protecting individuals from harmful externalities); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and 
Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 602–07 (2001) (analyzing how entitlement allocation affects parties’ ex ante actions and investment regarding externalities); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in 
the Theory of Property and Liability Rules, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 121–29 (2003) (rejecting the correlated-value claim that liability rules cannot harness private information when disputing parties’ valuations are correlated). 
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them.  An alternative is that the rich independent law and economics 
literature (and other literatures) will continue to find a way into the core 
courses.  But I have suggested that there are limits, perhaps already 
reached, for this to continue.29  In the next part of this Article, I suggest 
what some of that rich literature is and indicate how difficult it will be to 
incorporate that literature into the economic treatment of core legal 
topics. 
III.  WHAT TO ADD? 
I said before that law and economics is developing a large, growing, 
and important independent scholarly literature.  There are two broad 
senses in which I mean to identify this literature.  The first  involves 
what I would roughly call traditional law and economics scholarship.  
This literature is characterized by the use of traditional microeconomic 
models—rational choice theory and game theory, for example—to 
investigate a broadening range of legal issues.  This literature has grown 
and developed due to two main factors.  First, scholars have developed 
logical extensions of the existing law and economics literature, such as 
the increasing amount of empirical work that seeks to confront some of 
the now standard law and economics results with new data sets to see if 
the theoretical conjectures and hypotheses survive that confrontation.30  
 
 29. Arguably, the most important concepts have already been incorporated.  In the future, only equally important new insights will find their way into the core course materials.  30. For example, Ward Farnsworth has surveyed many recent cases in which courts have awarded injunctive relief to the plaintiff in order to see whether the hypotheses of Calabresi and Melamed are borne out.  Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to 
Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment: A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 381–91 (1999).  Calabresi and Melamed hypothesized that courts could efficiently protect legal entitlements in situations of very low transaction costs by awarding the entitlement holder some form of equitable relief, which they call “property rules.”  In situations of high transaction costs, courts could efficiently protect legal entitlements by serving as a hypothetical market-maker and requiring the defendant-injurer to pay the entitlement holder a price that compensated him or her, which they called “liability rules.”  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089–93 (1972).  One implication of the Calabresi & Melamed hypothesis is that if courts award equitable relief in situations of low transaction costs, then in at least some instances there will be postinjunction bargaining between the parties, resulting in the entitlement holder’s waiving his or her right to be free from further invasion upon payment of an adequate sum by the defendant-injurer.  Farnsworth found no instances of postinjunction bargaining. The economic theory of tort liability hypothesizes, among other things, that potential 
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Also, scholars have used the traditional methods to look at new topics in 
the law, such as comparative law issues or the relationship between 
social norms and law.31 
The second sense is literature that is critical of the core assumptions or 
settled conclusions of law and economics and seeks to refine the assumptions 
or to question the conclusions.  I want to be careful to distinguish this 
literature from literature that is simply skeptical of the entire law and 
economics enterprise.  I would suggest that Professors Cass Sunstein, 
Jeff Harrison, and Owen Jones are examples of those who are writing 
critically about some of the assumptions or conclusions of law and 
economics, but are doing so from within the circle of those who find the 
basic premise of law and economics to be useful in looking at legal 
questions. 
In the remainder of this Part, I want to focus on the burgeoning 
literature that is critical but respectful of law and economics—that of my 
second sense above—and speculate on how it might work its way into 
the law school curriculum.  In the interest of time, I will focus on only 
two related fields that are vying for space in the law school and law and 
economics curricula: socioeconomics and behavioral science.  But there 
are other innovations that fall within the same general spirit and to which 
the same general comments I shall make about socioeconomics and 
behavioral science would apply.32 
 
injurers and victims will take precautionary action so as to avoid liability.  The late Professor Gary T. Schwartz surveyed a wide number of studies of industries and practices and found modest support for the proposition that tort law deters unreasonably injurious behavior.  Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort 
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 390–430 (1994).  31. For an example of the economic analysis of comparative corporate law issues, see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 455–68 (arguing that there no longer are  meaningful distinctions among corporate law regimes in the world; rather, all regimes are moving towards the model of shareholder wealth maximization).  On the issues of the relationship between social norms and law, see sources cited supra note 19.  32. Of these other innovations, the one that strikes me as raising some of the most interesting issues is the evolutionary analysis of law.  For examples of that scholarship, see generally Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 207 (2001) (responding to theoretical criticism and arguing that behavior biology can inform legal theory as have the fields of psychology and economics); Owen D. Jones, Law and the Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 151 (2000) (discussing how behavioral biological principles can be integrated with other life science and social science approaches in the study of rape); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral 
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001) (arguing that advances in behavioral biology have overtaken existing concepts of bounded rationality, allowing for better modeling of human irrational behavior for legal theorizing). 
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A.  Socioeconomics 
While there is a vigorous and growing socioeconomics section of the 
American Association of Law Schools, the boundaries of that field are 
not clear to outsiders.  It is even fair to say that insiders are not sure what 
unites them.  As a result, the field covers a great deal of interesting 
material, but not yet in a coherent manner that makes its learning evident 
to outsiders.  If there are unifying themes among the membership, these 
might be a skepticism about rational choice-based law and economics 
and a sense that traditional law and economics pays too little attention to 
matters of distributive equity. 
My saying that there is no core to socioeconomics is not meant to be a 
criticism so much as a statement about the early stage in which the field 
finds itself.  Like other academic innovations, it will not be clear for some 
time whether this particular innovation will survive and prosper.  Recall 
I mentioned earlier that when law and economics began in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, it had the great good fortune to have Richard Posner 
pull it all together in a text that made the subject matter of the new 
field intelligible to outsiders.  This has not yet happened in socioeconomics 
(nor, as we shall see, in behavioral science or in the evolutionary analysis 
of law), but it might.33  Indeed, I would think that it must happen in order 
for that field to prosper.  There have already been several very interesting 
attempts to put some socioeconomic literature into law and economics,34 
and there will no doubt be more. 
How, if at all, will this literature come into the law school curriculum?  
One possibility is that some of the texts, such as those of Professor 
Dallas and Professor Harrison, will bring socioeconomic literature within 
the received law and economic canon.  There will be some stand-alone 
 
 33. In fact, it is happening.  Professor Lynne Dallas of the University of San Diego School of Law has a comprehensive and intriguing socioeconomics text forthcoming.  LYNNE DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH (forthcoming 2004).  34. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Teaching Contracts from a Socioeconomics Perspective, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1233, 1236–41 (2000) (showing that preferences are not exogenous, as rational choice theory assumes, but frequently induced by seller advertising); see also JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES (2002); ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, CHALLENGING COASE: SOCIOECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS IN THE FIRST-YEAR CONTRACTS COURSE (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 51, 2002) (showing how some of the law and economic analysis of contract doctrine needs to be amended in light of behavioral economics and evolutionary game theory), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_ id=306565. 
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courses in law and economics that will adopt that approach, while others 
will opt for the nonsocioeconomic treatments available.  Some stand-
alone courses may try to acknowledge the existence of the socioeconomic 
literature by assigning supplemental reading in that field.  But that will 
strain the already overfull stand-alone curriculum. 
With respect to the core law school courses that now include some law 
and economics, I think that socioeconomics will have a difficult but not 
impossible time breaking into those courses.  As I mentioned above, the 
core courses are already filled with doctrine and a little law and 
economics.  I doubt that there will be room for much more, from 
whatever quarter it might come.  I suspect that if socioeconomics can 
reduce its learning to a clear set of precepts—akin to the central premise 
of law and economics noted above—and pithy examples, then there may 
be room for socioeconomics in the doctrinal courses.  There is also the 
strong possibility that the socioeconomic focus on matters of equitable 
distribution and fairness will find a deeper resonance among doctrinal 
scholars than has the focus on efficiency of traditional law and 
economics.  If that is the case, then it may well be that socioeconomics, 
once its core learning is settled, will have an even larger impact on the 
doctrinal courses than that had by traditional law and economics. 
B.  Behavioral Law and Economics 
There has been a great deal of interest in an internal critique of law 
and economics that uses the insights of cognitive and social psychology 
to question rational choice theory and its role in legal analysis.35  This 
new field is called either law and behavioral science or behavioral law 
and economics.36  The field is in the same tenuous state as socioeconomics 
in the sense that there is not yet a textual treatment of the field.  That has 
begun to change, and more changes are on the way.37 
 
 35. I refer to this as an internal critique because many of those who are participating are traditional law and economics scholars. 
 36. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–75 (1998) (outlining a “systematic framework” to apply behavioral approaches to the economic analysis of law); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law 
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1057–59 (2000) (arguing that law and economics can be “reinvigorated” by replacing its rationality assumptions with “a more nuanced understanding of human behavior” found in the emerging law and behavioral science paradigm).  See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (providing an overview of how the field of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology can be applied to the study of law).  37. Jeff Harrison’s text, see HARRISON, supra note 34, already contains extensive behavioral material, as does Professor Dallas’s forthcoming text, see DALLAS, supra note 33. 
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A remarkable thing about this literature is that much of it is being 
produced by law professors.  This is a departure from the usual practice 
in the various examples of “law and . . . .”  Heretofore, much of the 
interdisciplinary work in law has consisted of simple arbitrage—of 
reading literature in other fields and applying its insights to legal 
topics—but not in doing original research in that collateral field.  But 
with respect to behavioral science, law professors have learned 
experimental techniques and have performed their own experiments to 
test rational choice predictions about explicitly legal behavior.38 
Will there be room in the stand-alone law and economics class or 
elsewhere in the law school curriculum for the literature in behavioral 
sciences as applied to law?  Here I think that the answer is an emphatic 
yes.  I am certain that the stand-alone course and the use of law and 
economics insights in the core courses will incorporate the behavioral 
literature.  It is simply too well-established, too powerful, and too 
fundamental to the legal enterprise of regulating behavior to ignore.  
Even if some doctrine and some other law and economics must be 
displaced, I think that room will be made for the behavioral sciences.  
This displacement will occur, one hopes, to the extent that it is superior 
scholarship to the rational choice-based law and economics scholarship.  
But it must be said that an additional reason for its acceptance is the 
widespread skepticism among doctrinal scholars about the value of 
rational choice in the analysis of legal matters. 
C.  Equitable Distribution of Wealth and Income 
I mentioned above that many students come to the study of law and 
economics with a belief that their generous impulses will get short shrift 
from economics.  There is more.  Many noneconomists apparently believe 
that economists do not like to discuss equitable issues or are hostile to 
the study of income and wealth distribution.39  That is a pernicious bit of 
 
 38. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 633–47 (1998) (describing the results of the author’s controlled experiments to test the preference exogeneity assumption in the context of contract default rules); David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1149–60 (2000) (describing the results of the authors’ experiment using mock juries to test relations group deliberations and individual deliberations on civil damage awards).  It is worth noting that one of the winners of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in the fall of 2002 was Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist working in the behavioral sciences.  39. Twenty years ago, my law school colleagues used to ask me, “Why are you 
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fiction.  I do not expect my assertions on the matter to be dispositive, but 
I will say that there has been much remarkable scholarship among 
economists about matters having to do with the distribution of income 
and wealth.40  I find this skepticism about economic interest in distribution 
to be so widespread among noneconomist law students that I make it a 
point in my stand-alone law and economics course to review much of 
that literature as part of my two-week introduction to microeconomic 
theory.  Here, let me refer to three important strands of the recent 
literature by economists or law and economics scholars on distributional 
issues simply to give a feel for the ongoing interest the topic and its 
importance. 
First, in a series of articles41 and now in an important book,42 Louis 
Kaplow and Steve Shavell have been arguing that it is more efficient to 
use the tax-and-transfer system than common law rules to redistribute 
income.  This is an important claim that, in fact, has been and deserves 
to be taken seriously.43  And the claims of Fairness Versus Welfare are 
so extraordinarily far-reaching that the book has been and will continue 
to be reviewed extensively.44  My point is that this is not ideological 
advocacy on the part of Kaplow and Shavell; it is serious and important 
scholarship. 
Second, in a forthcoming review of Fairness Versus Welfare, Professor 
Dan Farber contends that modern microeconomics has provided some 
vital insights into the topic of equity by, for example, developing game-
theoretic notions of how a cooperative surplus ought to be divided—for 
example, the Nash bargaining equilibrium and fair-division games.45 
 
economists in favor of racial discrimination?”  Happily, I never hear this sort of nonsense any more.  40. The remarkable field of social choice or collective choice, for work in which both Kenneth Arrow and Amartya Sen have won Nobel Prizes, is only one example.  41. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?  
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less 
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).  42. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
 43. See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1031–41 (2001) (evaluating Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis of the redistribution efficiency of liability rules); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus 
Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 800–20 (2000) (adapting Kaplow and Shavell’s economic analysis to argue that the ability to redistribute by income tax does not make it appropriate to ignore redistributive goals when evaluating legal rules). 
 44. See generally David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 351 (2002) (reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)); Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1995–2010 (2002) (book review).  45. Dan Farber, Kaplow & Shavell: Fairness Versus Welfare, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1813–20 (2003); see also STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: 
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Third, there is a fascinating new economic literature on the effect that 
inequitable income and wealth distributions have on a nation’s growth 
and political health.  At the risk of doing an injustice to this rich empirical 
literature, I can summarize some of the conclusions as follows: (1) societies 
with extreme inequalities of income and wealth distribution do not grow 
as quickly as those with more equitable distributions,46 and (2) those 
societies with inequitable income and wealth distributions run a grave 
risk of the very wealthy investing significantly in perverting the 
governance and judicial institutions of the society to favor their 
maintaining or increasing their wealth.47 
Will this literature be of interest to stand-alone law and economics 
classes and to the core law school curriculum?  Certainly so.  Lawyers, 
law professors, and law students are deeply interested in matters of 
fairness, justice, and equity, and all three of these examples of recent 
economic literature are bound to find their ways into the legal curriculum 
and into legal scholarship. 
D.  Other Topics 
There are other topics that are seeking to crowd into the law and 
economics or core law school curriculum.  For example, there is an 
increasing empirical and experimental literature on legal topics.48  That 
 
FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1–5 (1996) (surveying the application of fair-division procedures using game theory to practical problems of resource allocation). 
 46. See PHILIPPE AGHION & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND GLOBALIZATION 1–3 (1998); GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 1–4 (2001); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and 
Economic Growth, 109 Q.J. ECON. 465, 484–85 (1994); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600, 617–18 (1994).  
See generally Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Tyranny of Inequality, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 521 (2000). 
 47. See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY i–xv (2002); EDWARD L. GLAESER ET AL., THE INJUSTICE OF INEQUALITY 4–7 (Harv. Inst. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 1967, 2002), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2002papers/ HIER1967.pdf; Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 20, 2002, at 62.  48. By “empirical” legal research, I mean formal attempts to test the believability of propositions about the law by confronting them with data.  See William M. Landes, 
The Empirical Side of Law and Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 169–80 (2003) (showing the relative infrequency of empirical law and economics scholarship when compared to empirical economics scholarship and offering an economic explanation for why law and economics scholars perform less empirical work than do economists).  See 
generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1; Ellickson, supra note 10; Symposium, supra note 18.  An indication of the rising importance of empirical work in legal scholarship is the founding of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies by Blackwell Publishers.  The 
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literature is not important only to law and economics; it is extremely 
important to doctrinal and other approaches to the law.  To cite but one 
example, Douglas Laycock’s empirical study of the use of equitable 
remedies in U.S. courts indicates that, far from being used only in 
instances in which compensatory money damages would be inadequate, 
equitable remedies are available virtually whenever the plaintiff asks for 
them.49  Theoretically, equity is invoked only in instances of irreparable 
injury, but it turns out that plaintiffs can always demonstrate to the 
court’s satisfaction that their injuries are irreparable. 
Of course, if we expect students to be able to read empirical work or 
even to perform it, then we will have to carve out some time in an 
already crowded curriculum for courses that teach them quantitative 
methods.  I am not proposing to teach only statistics and regression 
analysis, but also experimental design, game theory, a little calculus, and 
more.  And I think that it is obvious that desirable though that 
knowledge may be to a legal scholar and even to a practitioner, there 
simply is not time in a standard three-year legal education to learn it 
adequately. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Law and economics is becoming a crowded house.  In addition to the 
core learning of the primary texts, there is a growing body of collateral 
scholarship that demands to be incorporated into the settled learning of 
the field.  I have been skeptical in this Article of the ability of the law 
school curriculum to accommodate the expansive literature in law and 
economics.  Some of that literature—for example, socioeconomics and 
behavioral science—has not yet resolved itself into crisp, clear material 
that can summarize the literature in that area; until it does so, I predict 
that it will not find that room will be made for it, either in the upper-
level curriculum or in the core law courses.  But there are signs that 
these extensions of law and economics are becoming richer, clearer, and 
succinct enough to make a strong case for inclusion in the core doctrinal 
courses.  The ultimate test for inclusion will be the significance of the 
literature to the legal issues at hand.  And on that test there will always 




journal, first published in January of 2004, is edited by Professors Theodore Eisenberg, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Stewart Schwab, and Martin Wells.  49. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE vii–x (1991). 
